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To the Editors (Kimberly Marten writes):
In “No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier,”
Thomas Johnson and Chris Mason argue that Pashtun tribal identities explain the lure
of the Taliban and the shortcomings of the initial U.S. approach to the war in Afghani-
stan.1 They carry this argument too far, however, and engage in cultural reductionism
by portraying the Pashtun tribal code as the determining factor behind politics and
preferences in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA). Johnson and
Mason make the following errors: (1) treating Pashtun identity as if it were set in stone;
(2) failing to consider that today’s radical Islamists rely on different sources of support
than did the mullahs (Islamic religious leaders) who led jihads against the British Em-
pire; and (3) misinterpreting the role of the ofªcial maliks (tribal and village leaders) in
the FATA.
idealizing an identity
Johnson and Mason state that “Pashtuns identify themselves in terms of their familial
ties and commitments, and have a fundamentally different way of looking at the
world” (p. 51). The authors assume that a shared identity determines Pashtun prefer-
ences and actions. Yet the literature on ethnic conºict and nationalism has established
that individuals have multiple identities; the inºuence of any one identity on particular
thoughts and actions depends on its salience at the time.2 Different aspects of identity
can be brought to the forefront by people’s socioeconomic circumstances or can be bol-
stered by political entrepreneurs seeking populist support.
This remains true for the Pashtuns despite the supposed overwhelming authority of
their tribal code. Pashtuns have proved remarkably mobile; they have often adapted
successfully to circumstances far outside their stateless homeland; and they are known
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for their success in migrating both socially and geographically.3 They have been a major
source of recruits for both the British Imperial and Pakistani armies. Many have labored
on construction projects in urban Pakistan. In addition, Pashtuns dominate the trucking
and transport trade in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. During the 1970s’ oil boom, vir-
tually every family in the FATA is believed to have sent at least one of its young men to
work in the Persian Gulf.4 Pashtun refugees from rural Afghanistan have become
deeply embedded in the urban Pakistani economy as skilled laborers.5
These commercial and employment activities are at odds with the Pashtuns’ tribal
code. The code scorns the pursuit of business and commerce as something lowly and
not Pashtun (the word for “shopkeeper” is an insult in the Pashto language). Real
Pashtun men are supposed to pursue agnatic (cousin) rivalry in their barren mountain
homeland, spurning life in the “settled” regions and using their incomes primarily to
support the hospitality they show in competition with their cousins.6
Even more tellingly, the vast majority of Pashtuns inside Pakistan live not in the
stateless FATA tribal region (with a total population of slightly more than 3 million, ac-
cording to the latest, 1998 census data7), but in the settled North-West Frontier Province
(NWFP), whose population includes around 14 million Pashtuns.8 Well-to-do Pashtun
families often have homes in both the FATA and the NWFP. Those living in the NWFP
are integrated into the politics and business of the state, participating in universal adult
suffrage and joining political parties at both the provincial and national levels.
Pashtuns also dominate the NWFP’s provincial bureaucracy. Since the February 2008
parliamentary elections, one of the key issues on the FATA agenda has become whether
and how the FATA might become a “normal,” integrated, state-penetrated province of
Pakistan.9
Furthermore, Johnson and Mason’s statement that Pashtuns have a “fundamentally
different way of looking at the world” begs the question: Different from whom? Clan
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ties and the importance of upholding family honor are far from unique to the Pashtuns,
having played an important role in violent insurgent behavior in areas of the world in-
cluding Iraq, Somalia, and Chechnya.10 Yet most of these areas have also witnessed pe-
riods when statehood ºourished. Saddam Hussein held Iraq together for decades. Since
the 2003 U.S. invasion, furthermore, sectarian violence in that country has aimed at
seizing state control or establishing separately governed states, not at ending statehood.
Chechnya was a quiescent part of the Soviet Union until the Gorbachev era; now
Chechen warlord Ramzan Kadyrov, the elected leader of the republic’s government,
has brokered a deal accepting Russian rule in return for rebuilding Chechnya’s shat-
tered economy. Even in Somalia, whose central and southern regions are suffused with
anarchic violence, the provinces of Somaliland and Puntland have established what
amount to state governance structures based on tribal codes of conduct.
muddling the mullahs
Johnson and Mason claim that the political rise of mullahs in the border areas in the late
1970s and their later spawning of the Taliban are congruent with the historical culture
of the tribal region. The authors, however, fail to consider the implications arising from
the fact that radical mullahs are now primarily supported by outsiders.
Johnson and Mason describe how the Pakistani government created the new phe-
nomenon of powerful Islamist mullahs and madrasas, ªrst to counteract the growing
attractiveness of Pashtun nationalism in the tribal areas, and then to lead a jihad against
the Soviet presence on Pakistan’s borders, using assistance from Saudi Arabia and the
United States.11 As the authors note, the Pakistani state intentionally empowered the
mullahs “at the expense of the tribal elders, khans, and maliks” (p. 70). Yet if tribal cul-
ture is so powerful, how could the government force these malik-challenging mullahs
on FATA society, any more than outsiders can force political penetration on the region
today?
Johnson and Mason attempt to answer this question by portraying the rise of the
mullahs as part of a continuing pattern in Pashtun history. So-called mad mullahs led
uprisings against the British Empire in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
(pp. 53–54), and Johnson and Mason hold that the new Islamist mullahs have simply
been leading a traditional uprising against Soviet (and later U.S.) interference in
Pashtun affairs. In an earlier article, the authors posit that Mullah Omar, the founder
of the Taliban, is an incarnation of the traditional charismatic mystics who led such ji-
hads in the past, predicting that if he is assassinated, the Taliban and the jihad will
crumble.12
The authors ignore a fundamental difference between the two eras, however. In ear-
lier times, mullahs received sustenance and protection by attaching themselves in a pa-
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tronage relationship to tribal leaders.13 Although a favored mullah might occasionally
receive a hereditary land grant from a wealthy khan that freed him from subservience,
most mullahs led impoverished lives and survived on alms.14 It was therefore not in
the mullah’s interest to challenge the political preferences of the malik, because his
word was unenforceable without malik support, unless he was the rare persona who
could attract his own lashkar (temporary militia) by virtue of his charisma. Mullahs and
maliks reinforced one another’s authority.15
The more recent Islamist mullahs, in contrast, arose independently from the tribes,
because they were funded and armed by outsiders rather than from within by tribal el-
ders. Even after the externally funded jihad against the Soviets ended, much of the
ªnancing for radical Islamist madrasas continued to come from Pakistanis living
abroad,16 not from local maliks. Now the Islamists are supported by foreign al-Qaida
operatives who rent housing and facilities in the FATA, and also by their participa-
tion in the transnational heroin trade. Many radical mullahs became part of the
“Kalashnikov culture” that suffused the tribal areas after the Soviet war in Afghanistan.
Some have coerced neighborhoods and villages at gunpoint into observing an unpopu-
lar form of sharia, using their militias to enforce personal dress and grooming codes
and to shut down suspect shops. As Johnson and Mason note, the more radical mullahs
have also mustered the means to assassinate hundreds of maliks (p. 57).
In an indication of the tenuousness of local support for these radicals, Pashtuns have
turned to the ballot box—a state institution—to challenge their rise. The Muttahida
Majlis-e-Amal party alliance, representing many of the more radical mullahs, was
voted out in the February 2008 elections in the NWFP despite its 2002 landslide victory,
largely because it could not provide two public goods usually associated with well-
functioning states: economic development and physical security.17
misreading the maliks
Johnson and Mason also fundamentally misunderstand the role of maliks in modern
Pashtun society. They argue that khans (the wealthy landowners of the fertile Pashtun
valleys) are only “primus inter pares,” and that maliks (in all Pashtun regions) are dem-
ocratically chosen; the council of all adult men (the jirga) in the tribe and clan provides
rule by consensus (p. 62). The tribal code sees all honorable adult men as having equal
political authority.
In theory, this description is correct. In historical fact, however, the British Empire
subverted that system long ago. Outsiders preferred to work with select individuals to
try to control the tribal regions, rather than going through the cumbersome jirga route
for negotiations. As a result, the British artiªcially empowered selected (i.e., “ofªcial”)
maliks and gave them hereditary stipends. These favored maliks received special per-
sonal compensation on top of the money distributed to the jirga, typically amounting to
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an additional 7 percent commission beyond what was paid to the tribe as a whole.18 In
direct violation of the tribal code, the maliks accepted this arrangement.19 Johnson and
Mason argue that if these British-selected individuals became too cut off from tribal
mores, they could be ousted by the jirga. But the favored maliks used their subventions
to set up patronage systems that ensured their continuing inºuence over the jirga.
Johnson and Mason argue that Britain’s attempt to impose its rule through individu-
als failed (pp. 52–53), causing it to give up trying to control the region. Yet even though
the British indeed received little value for their payments, the structure they created has
endured. When the Pakistani state declared independence in 1947, it had to negotiate
with the maliks to gain the allegiance of the tribal areas, and decided to continue the
policy of individual hereditary subvention to ensure continued malik loyalty.20 As a re-
sult, mainstream Pashtun society has long assumed that many of the maliks are, by
deªnition, corrupt.21 For example, when the government offered development assis-
tance to the FATA in the early 1970s in a bid to thwart support for a separatist
Pashtunistan, the ofªcial maliks received not only monetary rewards for their coopera-
tion in providing land for state projects, but also control over construction contracts for
schools, hospitals, and roads that were then often shoddily built by members of the
maliks’ families.22 They have controlled who in the FATA receives everything from gov-
ernment jobs and scholarships to visas for labor migration, favoring their family mem-
bers and clients over others.
It is thus unrealistic to expect that the Pashtun population will rally around the
maliks as a source of legitimate authority. Johnson and Mason are correct that the
maliks have provided “the only stabilizing force that the region has ever known”
(p. 73). But this stability has served the interests of an elite old guard, which is widely
believed to be colluding with the local representatives of the Pakistani state to further
the corrupt business interests of their own families.23
conclusion
Johnson and Mason perform a valuable service for policymakers by revealing the tribal
loyalties and cultural tendencies that inºuence the politics of the FATA. But their rec-
ommendations for solving the FATA’s problems, including “strengthen[ing] and re-
build[ing] the tribal structures from the inside” (p. 73), and restoring the mullahs “to
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their traditional role of spiritual advisers and mentors to the people” (p. 74), are un-
workable. There is no category of traditional leaders left today that enjoys true
legitimacy.
The ideal outcome might be for the FATA to achieve integration as (or perhaps
within) a constituent province of Pakistan. It must be recognized, though, that change
through constitutional elections threatens the dominance of both the radical mullahs
and the remaining ofªcial maliks, who are likely to use their resources to try to thwart
it. What is needed to resolve this situation is not the kind of stability that has beneªted
the old guard, but the inspiration and revolutionary empowerment of the ordinary
Pashtun populace.
—Kimberly Marten
New York City, New York
Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason Reply:
We thank Kimberly Marten for her letter in response to our article.1 Marten makes a
number of points, some valid, some less so. Before addressing her main criticisms, we
would like to brieºy restate our central argument.
our analysis
In our article we argue that an understanding of Pashtun tribal culture, social architec-
ture, and history is critical in assessing why a signiªcant portion of the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border region has become home to extremist groups such as the Taliban
and al-Qaida. We suggest that this border area is susceptible to religious extremist
movements and resistant to the imposition of external governance, in part because of
the Pashtun’s unique social code known as Pashtunwali, a remarkable set of social val-
ues and unwritten but universally understood precepts that deªne Pashtun culture
and the Pashtun ideal type. Yet while the Pashtun tribal culture and the ethos of the
Pakistan-Afghanistan border area are important, to be understood they need to be as-
sessed in the context of the complex geographical, political, historical, and religious
factors that helped create them. We conclude by positing that in both southern
Afghanistan and the tribal areas of Pakistan, rather than seeking to “extend the reach of
the central government,” which simply foments insurgency among a proto-insurgent
people, the United States and the international community should be doing everything
in their means to empower the tribal elders and restore balance to a tribal/cultural sys-
tem that has been disintegrating since the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979.
marten’s critique
Perhaps the best way to address Marten’s comments is to respond to them in the order
in which they are raised. Marten ªrst suggests that numerous Pashtuns are economic
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migrants. Fair enough. Our article, however, does not concern itself with the Pashtun
Diaspora, but rather with the behavior of the Pashtun still in the tribal areas. It is un-
clear to us why the diaspora is germane to our research question or analysis. We are not
sure what the applicability of Pashtun taxi drivers in London, for example, would be to
the behavior of their shepherding cousins still in the hills of Waziristan. But even those
who leave temporarily, we would suggest, generally take their social code with them:
Scotland Yard reportedly maintains a database of known clan feuds in Pakistan to gen-
erate leads to potential suspects in murders of Pashtuns in Great Britain, for example.
Indeed, we suspect the enduring power of Pashtunwali values after generations in
London or California is a better argument for our perspective than against it. As Olivier
Roy has written, “Afghan identity is based on a common political culture which could
be summarized as follows. ‘Real’ political life is played out at the local level and pri-
mary loyalty lies with a ‘solidarity group,’ whatever its sociological basis. This function
can be fulªlled by any community, clan, tribe, village etc., composed of an extended
network of people who tend to consider that they are protected by this group afªliation
and that they could build on it for whatever purpose (business relations, political con-
stituency, patronage and clientelism, and also—during the war—armed resistance).”2
Marten does not appear to acknowledge that for the Pashtun, vital social and politi-
cal concepts such as justice are inextricably linked to the maintenance of honor. The
synthesis of justice and honor is in turn an essential component of Pashtun tribal iden-
tity and foundational for the interactions of Pashtuns with their surroundings, al-
though not necessarily at the expense of other aspects of time and space. Contrary to
Marten’s claim, our article does not represent cultural reductionism. The objective of
our article was to assess the reasons for the historical proto-insurgent tendencies of the
Pashtun relative to their neighbors in a short, policy-relevant format. Our analysis
clearly suggests that Pashtunwali is a central—if not the key—explanatory variable. At
the same time, we do note that “tribalism and tribal social structure alone cannot ac-
count for [all] . . . insurgent behavior” (p. 54). It is a misrepresentation of our argument
to claim that we believe that Pashtunwali is the only determining factor of Pashtun po-
litical life. A careful reading of our article will ªnd a series of other temporal as well as
spatial variables discussed. Similarly, we disagree with Marten’s claim that we believe
the Pashtun code is “set in stone,” arguing instead that Pashtunwali is “intrinsically
ºexible and dynamic” (p. 59).
Marten also takes issue with our contention that the Pashtun follow a unique cogni-
tive paradigm, and asks, “Different from whom?” Different from that found in the
United States was a central and obvious point of the article. Here she elides our de-
tailed description of Pashtun culture to “clan ties and the importance of upholding
family honor,” as if these were the only characteristics of the complex Pashtun society
we describe. We think that our argument is considerably more nuanced, but grant that
other preliterate tribal societies share some characteristics. Our point was that none of
the dozens of other tribes in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region, either historically
or today, share or have shared the Pashtun proclivity for jihad. The explanation for this,
International Security 33:3 186
2. Olivier Roy, Afghanistan: Internal Politics and Socio-Economic Dynamics and Groupings (Paris: Na-
tional Center of Scientiªc Research, March 1, 2003), p. 4, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/
3e9ae5535.html.
when all else is equal both economically and geographically, is culture. Marten then
raises the examples of other tribal societies far from the Pakistan-Afghan border. We do
not feel that the existence of other tribes thousands of miles from the Pashtun belt with
typically tribal value systems, such as her reference to Iraqi, Somali, or Chechen tribes,
undermines our central argument. We would also suggest that it is more accurate to
speak of Somali clans, clan families, or clan lineages rather than Somali “tribes” and
“tribal codes of conduct.” Clan loyalty is the key in Somalia, not tribes.
Furthermore, Marten’s contention that Chechnya “was a quiescent part of the Soviet
Union until the Gorbachev era” is unsustainable. In fact, the history of Chechnya is one
of almost continual bloody revolution against Russian and Soviet rule, including major
rebellions in 1722, 1785–91, 1816–27 (the time of the infamous Yermolov massacres), the
Caucasus War of 1817–64, rebellions again in 1877–78, 1917, and 1929–39, with armed
resistance continuing through the 1930s. The only reason Chechnya was “quiescent” for
a short time in the 1940s and early 1950s was because of Joseph Stalin’s massacre or de-
portation of virtually the entire Chechen adult male population during World War II.
As soon as the survivors returned home in the late 1950s, Chechen resistance began
again and has essentially never stopped.3
mulling over mullahs
Marten’s contention that we argue that “Islamist mullahs have simply been leading a
traditional uprising against Soviet (and later U.S.) interference in Pashtun affairs” ei-
ther misunderstands or misrepresents our point that such religious leaders seeking po-
litical power have used these traditional tropes and culturally understood methods of
social mobilization to further their agendas.4 Although we readily agree that some
of today’s village mullahs have sources of revenue independent of their villages, so
too did most of the charismatic mullahs who fomented revolt against British and later
Pakistani authority. These men, too, were not reliant on the ªnancial support of their
home villages, but rather, as itinerant travelers, were dependent on the traditional hos-
pitality of villages and the critical support network immanent to the Pirimuridi tradi-
tion at mosques along the way. Among them were the Fakir of Ipi and the Mullah of
Hadda, both of whom rose to inºuence primarily outside their home villages.5 More-
over, the independent income that village mullahs receive today from jihadist sources
strikes us as a powerful argument in favor of our suggestion that tribal elders be
reempowered with cash stipends, where appropriate, to help level the playing ªeld in
terms of the ability to leverage inºuence in Pashtun tribes. In this part of her argument,
Marten uses the term “Islamist,” but we would argue that the term “Islamist” does
not fully apply to the rural, often functionally illiterate mullahs of the mountain vil-
lages, who embody a far more syncretic version of Islam than that, say, of the Muslim
Brotherhood, where the term is more applicable.
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Moreover, in several instances, Marten seriously mischaracterizes our position. For
example, when writing about the maliks favored by the British, she states, “Johnson
and Mason argue that if these British-selected individuals became too cut off from tribal
mores, they could be ousted by the jirga.” Nowhere in our article do we make this
argument.
maliks and power relationships
Elsewhere, Marten writes, “Johnson and Mason are correct that the maliks have pro-
vided ‘the only stabilizing force that the region has ever known.’” This substantially
misrepresents what we wrote. The article actually says that the “collective control” of
the tribal elders and maliks “is the only stabilizing force the region has ever known”
(p. 73), with the clear inference throughout the article that the tribal elders were by far
the most important of the two. Our discussion of maliks was admittedly brief; they do
still exist, at least in theory, in some parts of the border area, but their authority to speak
for the tribes has been devastated to a far greater extent than that of the traditional role
of the elders in Pashtun consciousness. Marten’s apparent conºation of maliks and the
more general term “village tribal elders” confuses much of her argument. Also, we ªnd
it curious that she raises the question, “If tribal culture is so powerful, how could the
government force these malik-challenging mullahs on FATA society, any more than out-
siders can force political penetration on the region today?” Obviously, the Pakistanis
did not force the mullahs on FATA society; they were already there in the villages as
they had been for centuries; what the Pakistanis did was pursue policies deliberately
designed to empower them politically, economically, socially, and militarily at the ex-
pense of the elders, the maliks, and the government’s Political Agents, resulting in the
disastrous situation in the region today.
Most important, Marten questions our three-part formula of (1) trying to achieve
some equilibrium in the border region through efforts to reestablish the social status
quo ante 1970, (2) injecting a massive infusion of development aid, and (3) engaging in
strong military action where necessary to implement parts (1) and (2). We grant fully
that the Taliban and its network of radicalized mullahs have now assumed almost total
political control over the FATA as well as over much of northern Pakistan and southern
Afghanistan, and that our solution at this point represents a slender reed. Indeed, the
situation has gone from very bad to much worse in the year plus since we initially
drafted the article in the summer of 2007. Recently, however, we have seen a number of
explicit and hopeful examples of a reawakening of the very power of traditional
Pashtun social institutions and mechanisms we discussed, as this quotation from a re-
cent New York Times article demonstrates: “The tribal militias, known as lashkars, have
quickly become a crucial tool of Pakistan’s strategy in the tribal belt. . . . The emergence
of the lashkars is a sign of the tribesmen’s rising frustration with the ruthlessness of
the Taliban, but also of their traditional desire to run their own affairs and keep the
Pakistani Army at bay. . . . The people of [the village of] Salarzai were strongly moti-
vated to keep the Taliban at bay, said Jalal Uddin, the son of one of the prominent local
elders. ‘I felt overjoyed when I was riding with the lashkar because it meant the old
tribal system was working,’ Mr. Uddin said.”6
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concluding thoughts
Olivier Roy succinctly sums up our argument concerning the vitality and power of
traditional Pashtun social structures and institutions when he argues, “There is no
other choice, in the short term, than to build on the traditional patterns of Afghan polit-
ical culture instead of importing a ready made model of anything, including democ-
racy.”7 What are needed are realistic, implementable approaches to this vexing
problem. Marten’s alternative policy proposal of “inspiration and revolutionary em-
powerment of the ordinary Pashtun populace” strikes us as unrealistic and lacking any
practicable implication for Western policy. Such vague formulations perhaps sound
good in academic seminars, but are impossible to put into practice on the hard rocky
ground where the ªrst sign of a very bad day is still a burst of gunªre.
There are no easy answers to the catastrophe that has taken place in the FATA and
the deadly danger that the situation there now poses to the West. What policymakers
need is more understanding of Pashtun culture and a pragmatic approach based on
what has worked in the past and less utopian rhetoric. Is our recommendation to put
the “Old Guard” as Marten calls them back in power reºective of the highest ideals of
human rights and democracy? We grant that it is not. But neither would be another
mass casualty attack on the United States of the type witnessed on September 11, 2001,
by an al-Qaida deeply embedded in the region and protected by the Taliban on both
sides of the border. We believe that our admittedly imperfect prescription offers
the best chance in a severely limited ªeld of options for preventing such a scenario,
while granting that even with an optimal implementation, it will take decades to undo
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October 24, 2008. Julian E. Barnes writes, “Confronting the prospect of failure after seven years in
Afghanistan, the U.S. military is crafting a new strategy that is likely to expand the power and
reach of that country’s tribal militias while relying less on the increasingly troubled central gov-
ernment.” Barnes, “U.S. Plans to Train Afghanistan Tribal Militias,” Los Angeles Times, October 10,
2008.
7. Roy, Afghanistan, p. 13.
